Seller briefings

Impact level

⚪ Background

⚠ Risk:Output prices are a factory-gate price index; they are not equivalent to retail or cross-border selling prices. There is no evidence on how much sellers’ costs will be passed through, so do not treat 6.8% as an equivalent price increase.

What happened

Statistics Netherlands (CBS) reported on September 30, 2026, that Dutch manufacturing output prices rose 6.8% year over year in August 2026, up from 5.1% in July, and 1.1% month over month. Prices rose 1.3% in export markets and 0.8% in the domestic market. By category, petroleum-derived products rose 59.7% year over year, chemicals 14.1%, rubber and plastics 9%, metal products 4.1%, machinery 1%, motor vehicles 1%, while electronics fell 0.2% and food fell 4.9%. In August, crude oil prices rose 31% year over year to nearly €76 per barrel. CBS said the rise in oil prices since March was due to geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. [1]

Seller impact

• InferenceThis is a factory-gate price index, not a consumer price or cross-border transaction price. Oil and gas and chemicals saw the largest increases, indicating that price rises were concentrated in energy-intensive upstream sectors. Electronics and food prices remained negative, showing that inflation was not broad-based. [1]
• InferenceFor sellers sourcing from or transshipping through the Netherlands, price pressure on inputs related to rubber and plastics, metals, and chemicals is relatively greater. However, without evidence on cost shares and pass-through rates, the impact on end prices cannot be estimated; data on lead times and capacity are also unavailable. [1]

Evidence that would disprove the assessment

• Assessment 1：If CBS subsequently revises the August data or September breakdowns show electronics and food prices turning positive, the assessment that inflation is “not broad-based” would no longer hold.
• Assessment 2：If upstream suppliers’ quotes or CBS breakdowns for subsequent months fall, this assessment of cost pressure should be revised downward.

Impact level

⚪ Background

What happened

On September 24, 2026, the Port of Rotterdam Authority and Deltalinqs welcomed TenneT and Stedin’s announcement that they would install a 500 MW temporary transformer at Europoort. They said it could release additional grid capacity sooner, allowing businesses to advance expansion and sustainability plans earlier. The transformer is expected to enter service as early as the end of 2028, provided permits are obtained and the necessary cable connections are completed. The structural solution is expected to be in place only after grid expansion is completed, sometime after 2032. [1]

Seller impact

• InferenceThis signals the continuation of grid congestion at Dutch ports from 2018 to 2026: new electricity connections in port areas remain subject to capacity constraints, with temporary transformation and demand-side flexibility as the only short-term bridge. No structural relief is likely before the end of 2028. [1]
• InferenceFor electricity-intensive warehousing, cold storage, processing, and distribution facilities in the Port of Rotterdam area, resistance to new or expanded electricity use remains. Specific queue times, available capacity, and costs have not been disclosed and are unknown. [1]

Evidence that would disprove the assessment

• Assessment 1：This assessment would no longer hold if TenneT/Stedin or the Port Authority subsequently announced an earlier start of operations, or canceled the temporary solution in favor of bringing a larger-scale grid connection online sooner. Reassess in the fourth quarter of 2026.
• Assessment 2：This assessment should be revised based on new data if the Port Authority or grid operators publish capacity allocation results and an access schedule for Europoort.

Impact level

⚪ Background

Deadline / window:16 October [1]

What happened

On September 18, the European Commission published a draft list proposing to authorize 32 non-OECD countries that have applied to continue importing non-hazardous waste from the EU after May 21, 2027. The public consultation is open through October 16. The first authorized list will be finalized by the end of 2026 and updated at least every two years. The Commission also published an assessment report on plastic waste exports to Türkiye: in 2025, the EU exported 510,000 tonnes of plastic waste to Türkiye, part of the 1.4 million tonnes of total EU plastic waste exports that year. Plastic waste exports to non-OECD countries will be prohibited from November 21, 2026. [1]

Seller impact

• InferenceFor sellers using EU-origin recycled materials or sourcing raw materials through EU waste channels, after May 21, 2027, non-hazardous waste may flow only to authorized countries. From November 21, 2026, plastic waste exports to non-OECD countries will be prohibited. The availability of relevant raw materials and documentation showing compliant sourcing will be affected. Specific product categories, volumes, and alternative sources are unknown. [1]
• InferenceThe draft and assessment report do not address any specific e-commerce platform or seller obligations, and provide no data on cost shares or delivery times. Therefore, their impact on seller costs, pricing, or platform compliance requirements cannot be quantified. Whether platforms will introduce new requirements for proof of recycled-material or waste origin remains to be verified. [1]

Evidence that would disprove the assessment

• Assessment 1：This assessment would no longer hold if the Commission’s final list authorizes all major destination countries, or if the ban’s effective date is revised and delayed. We recommend checking the consultation page and final list again within the next two weeks.
• Assessment 2：This assessment should be updated if any e-commerce platform or EU authority subsequently announces reporting or documentation requirements for sellers.

Impact level

⚪ Background

What happened

Data released by Dutch CBS on September 18, 2026: In 2025, the Netherlands imported 546 million kilograms of steel products from outside the EU that are subject to the latest EU safeguard measures, half the 2018 level, when the measures were first introduced. Imports peaked at 1.2 billion kilograms in 2021. Japan, China, India, South Korea, and Türkiye together accounted for 73.7% in 2025. From July 2026, the new measures apply to 52% of non-EU steel product categories, representing about 16% of the Netherlands’ total import value and 29% of its non-EU steel import volume. The number of EU regulations in force that include anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures rose from around 30 in 1994 to 158 in 2025. [1]

Involves:Steel products

Seller impact

• InferenceInference: Tighter safeguard measures (with expanded coverage from July 2026) and a growing number of anti-dumping regulations are continuing to narrow the channels for non-EU steel entering the Netherlands. For importers already within quota, compliance and quota costs are rising, which could push up procurement prices within the EU. [1]
• InferenceInference: Of the decline in imports between 2018 and 2025, the 2022 sanctions on Russia and Belarus are an identifiable one-off structural change. In the other years, measures and demand both played a role, and CBS data alone cannot attribute the trend to a single factor. [1]

Evidence that would disprove the assessment

• Assessment 1：If imports of non-EU steel into the Netherlands rebound after the rules take effect in July 2026, or the number of EU regulations declines, this assessment that measures are tightening would no longer hold.
• Assessment 2：If the trend excluding Russia and Belarus diverges substantially from the original series, or CBS revises its statistical basis, this attribution should be reassessed.

Impact level

⚪ Background

What happened

On 2026-09-11, the European Commission adopted an assessment report concluding that the current recycling efficiency and material recovery targets in Parts B and C of Annex XII to the Batteries Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 are appropriate and that there are no grounds for revision. The report assessed the existing and expected supplies of cobalt, copper, lead, lithium, and nickel. Under the Regulation, the Commission must carry out an assessment at least every five years; the next assessment is due no later than 2031-08-18. [1]

Involves:Waste batteries、Lead-acid batteries、Lithium-based batteries、Nickel-cadmium batteries

Seller impact

• FactThe regulatory targets remain unchanged. The recycling efficiency targets for 2025-12-31 and the material recovery targets for 2027-12-31 (90% for cobalt, copper, lead, and nickel; 50% for lithium) remain in place. Parties involved in EU battery recycling and recycled-material supply do not need to redo their target assumptions. Near-term compliance pressures have neither eased nor intensified as a result of this assessment. [1]
• InferenceThe report says the targets balance ambition and feasibility and are intended to support the RESourceEU Action Plan’s diversification of raw-material supplies (reducing the battery-related raw-material value chain’s dependence on any single source country by 30%–50% by 2029). This is a directional statement. It provides no data on recycled-material prices, capacity, or procurement volumes, so the actual price impact on raw materials cannot be determined. [1]

Evidence that would disprove the assessment

• Assessment 1：This assessment would no longer hold if the Commission later published a revision proposal or a new delegated act changing the target values in Annex XII.
• Assessment 2：This inference should be revised if the Commission publishes quantifiable data on recycled-material supply and demand, capacity, or prices showing that dependence is not declining as planned.

Impact level

⚪ Background

What happened

Statistics Netherlands (CBS) reported on September 9, 2026, that greenhouse gas emissions in the Netherlands rose 0.6% year over year in the second quarter of 2026. Emissions from the power sector rose nearly 22%, with coal consumption up 87% and natural gas consumption up 15% year over year, partly due to increased electricity exports to Belgium (BE). Transport sector emissions fell by more than 10%, mainly because of lower diesel consumption. The report said that Germany’s diesel tax relief made international freight drivers more likely to refuel there; under IPCC accounting rules, those emissions are counted in Germany. Manufacturing emissions edged down 1% (as several energy intensive companies in the chemical industry reduced production during maintenance), but still accounted for 34% of total emissions. On a national accounts basis, CO2 emissions rose 2.5%, or 1.4% after weather adjustment, while GDP grew 1.3%. [1]

Seller impact

• InferenceCoal and gas use for electricity generation in the Netherlands rose in tandem, indicating that marginal power generation still depends on fossil fuels and that electricity prices are sensitive to fuel costs. However, without data on fuel procurement prices, electricity prices, or delivery times, the actual pass-through to electricity costs for Dutch warehousing and distribution cannot be determined. [1]
• InferenceThe German diesel tax relief has led cross-border freight to refuel in Germany, a route shift driven by fiscal price differences rather than a change in total capacity. The source names no logistics providers, ports, or routes, and provides no freight rate or delivery time data, so the effect on sellers’ freight costs is unknown. [1]

Evidence that would disprove the assessment

• Assessment 1：This assessment would no longer hold if a subsequent CBS revision showed that coal consumption in the power sector had not risen (for example, if the 87% figure were corrected), or if power sector emissions fell in the next quarter.
• Assessment 2：The route shift assessment would no longer hold if Germany canceled or narrowed the diesel tax relief, or if Dutch transport emissions returned to the same level as a year earlier.

Impact level

⚪ Background

What happened

On September 8, 2026, Samsung Electronics and ASML announced an expansion of their long-term strategic collaboration to deepen cooperation on High NA EUV lithography and advanced processes. Samsung will join an industry initiative to advance next-generation 12-inch photomask technology and plans to be the first in the industry to introduce ASML High NA EUV into DRAM mass production, as early as 2028. The companies said this approach could help simplify processes, reduce costs, and ease patterning constraints, but did not disclose investment amounts, capacity targets, or specific customers. [1]

Involves:High NA EUV lithography equipment、12-inch photomask、DRAM

Seller impact

• InferenceThe collaboration is a signal of long-cycle capital spending. The 2028 DRAM mass-production target means orders for equipment, photomasks, and materials will be released gradually over the next several years, with no near-term change to memory supply and demand. For sellers, DRAM spot and contract prices will still depend on current supply and demand; this does not support a claim that prices for end-user electronics will rise. [1]
• ScenarioIf 12-inch photomasks and High NA lithography are adopted, they could widen the cost gap between advanced and mature process nodes, indirectly affecting the long-term supply structure of chips used in memory modules and consumer electronics. The extent of pass-through, lead times, and evidence on qualification of alternatives have not been disclosed and remain unknown. [1]

Evidence that would disprove the assessment

• Assessment 1：This assessment would be invalidated if Samsung or ASML later announces a delay to the 2028 timeline, cancels the 12-inch photomask plan, or third-party data shows that DRAM capacity and prices are unaffected by this approach. Recheck official updates over the next two weeks.
• Assessment 2：This scenario would not hold if industry plans do not result in actual capacity, or if the shift to 12-inch photomasks stalls because of cost and yield challenges.

Impact level

⚪ Background

What happened

On September 6, 2026, European Commission President von der Leyen visited Nuuk and announced a €200 million Global Gateway partnership plan to invest in Greenland in 2026 and the following year. The EU, Greenland, and Denmark signed a new joint declaration covering cooperation on education, fisheries, satellites and cable connectivity, hydropower, critical raw materials, housing, sustainable tourism, and support for small businesses. Funding and scheduling details, procurement or tendering methods, and eligibility requirements for business participation have not been announced. [1]

Seller impact

• InferenceCritical raw materials, satellites, and cable connectivity are included in the EU–Greenland cooperation framework, signaling a structural focus on resources and infrastructure. However, the €200 million is the total funding envelope for bilateral cooperation; no specific mineral or cable projects, capacity, or start dates have been disclosed. It therefore does not constitute a verifiable increase in supply in the short term. [1]
• InferenceThe direct impact on cross-border sellers cannot currently be assessed: the document does not mention tariffs, logistics rates, product access, or platform rules, nor does it specify procurement or supply arrangements. Greenland is not an EU member, and it is unknown whether investment and trade rules will change as a result. [1]

Evidence that would disprove the assessment

• Assessment 1：If the EU’s subsequent investment list does not include critical raw materials or connectivity projects, or if the funds are actually allocated to other areas, this assessment of the direction will no longer hold.
• Assessment 2：If the EU or Denmark subsequently issues related measures concerning imports, exports, market access, or logistics, the assessment that there is currently no direct impact will need to be revised.

Impact level

⚪ Background

What happened

The Netherlands’ CBS reported on August 28, 2026: Dutch manufacturing producer prices rose 5.2% year over year in July 2026 (up 4.3% in June) and 0.8% month over month. Prices rose 1.3% in export markets and 0.2% in the domestic market. By industry: petroleum derivatives rose 42.7% year over year, chemicals 12.3%, rubber and plastics 9.8%, fabricated metal products 4.5%, machinery 0.9%, electronic products 0.3%, automobiles 0.1%, and food fell 5.9%. The average Brent crude price in July was above EUR 73 per barrel, up nearly 24% year over year; CBS attributed this to geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. [1]

Involves:Petroleum derivatives、Chemicals、Rubber and plastics、Fabricated metal products、Machinery

Seller impact

• InferencePrice increases were highly concentrated in the oil and gas supply chain: increases for petroleum derivatives and chemicals were far higher than for machinery, electronics, and automobiles (all below 1%). This suggests an energy cost shock rather than an economy-wide demand boom. Sellers of downstream products such as plastics, paints, and synthetic fibers face higher input costs; the extent and timing of pass-through are unknown. [1]
• InferenceCBS notes that chemical prices are linked to oil prices but often lag behind them. Chemical prices were already up 16.6% year over year in June, more than July’s 12.3%; their month-over-month direction was opposite to the overall increase of 0.8%. This points more toward cyclical fluctuations than one-way structural price increases. [1]

Evidence that would disprove the assessment

• Assessment 1：If year-over-year increases for chemicals and rubber and plastics fall to levels similar to machinery and electronics in subsequent months, the assessment that the divergence is energy-driven will no longer hold.
• Assessment 2：If year-over-year increases for chemicals and petroleum derivatives continue to accelerate in August–September and export price increases widen, the assessment that fluctuations are the main factor will need to be revised.

Impact level

⚪ Background

What happened

A preliminary estimate by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), based on data from the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO), puts Dutch semiconductor industry turnover in 2025 at about €45.6 billion (also reported in the article as €46 billion), up from €21.3 billion in 2019 and more than double over six years. Employment rose from 23,200 in 2019 to 43,200 in 2025. From 2019 to 2025, semiconductor-related activities' share of company turnover increased from 46% to 51%. New companies entering the market contributed about €400 million in additional turnover and around 2,000 jobs. CBS says the statistical method is still being developed and all the data are preliminary. [1]

Seller impact

• FactThese data show that revenue related to the semiconductor industry in the Netherlands has grown for six consecutive years. Around 5 percentage points of the increase came from companies shifting their internal business mix toward semiconductors, rather than from pure expansion in scale. This indicates a rising share for equipment, components, and services in the domestic Dutch supply chain. However, these figures measure industry turnover and do not include profit margins, capacity utilization, or order visibility, so they cannot establish whether the upturn will last. [1]
• InferenceFor cross-border sellers, these data do not directly signal prices or supply for any consumer electronics end products. Dutch semiconductor industry statistics cover suppliers of chips, equipment, components, and services; they do not represent changes in end-product electronics capacity or prices. There is insufficient evidence on cost shares and pass-through rates to determine whether rising raw material prices will feed through to finished products. [1]

Evidence that would disprove the assessment

• Assessment 1：This structural assessment would not hold if CBS later revises down the 2025 semiconductor-related turnover or its share, or if the contribution from new companies is shown to have been significantly overstated.
• Assessment 2：If comparable data on end-product factory prices or BOM costs become available and move in the same direction as data for the Dutch semiconductor sector, this assessment that there is no direct pass-through should be revised.